There is a substantial difference between our way of «philosophizing», born out of Descartes'clear and well-defined thinking and bent on building alternative (aut-aut) models, and the classical (especially Platonic-Aristotelian) way where a constant use of technical and methodical pluralism serves to juxtapose different (et-et) schemes necessary to grasp an intrinsically one-manifold reality. The ancient Philosophers bring a great wealth of schemes into play, albeit in different forms. This is to say that one could also come across statements that are clearly mismatched and sometimes even at odds with one another, without either giving rise to a real contradiction or (even less so) a quasi relativistic viewpoint. Quite the contrary, an approach of this kind focuses on the necessary knowledge of a reality which, however, is multiform.
By assuming this interpretative paradigm and applying it to some of the most pivotal reflections of the Sophists, Plato and Aristotle, the Authors of the contributions herein provide a number of particularly eloquent examples of that typically «Greek» movement, which is to proceed steadily by association of possibilities, rejecting the either/or solicitations and hinging their reflections upon the more open and dynamic «and-and» combination.
The authors believe that many of the puzzles of Ancient philosophy that have involved and divided scholars can acquire a new and convincing explanation with this paradigm.
The essays collected in this volume focus on Aristotle's notion of nous (usually translated as «intellect»,«mind» or simply «thinking») in Aristotle's works. They aim at elucidating the status and the function of the intellectual faculty in the context of Aristotle's analysis of the faculties of the soul and, more generally, of his conception of science. The volume also contains an overview on the origin and the evolution of the meaning of the term nous before Aristotle.
Con il nome tradizionale di «destino» in età ellenistica e romana viene indicata la tesi secondo cui tutto avviene in modo ineluttabile. Gli Stoici furono i principali sostenitori di questa tesi. A loro parere, siccome tutto ha una causa, l'intreccio delle cause e degli eventi è predeterminato e immodificabile. Ciò non impedisce che vi siano azioni e di cui noi siamo responsabili, perché noi introduciamo nell'intreccio degli eventi del mondo un tipo di causalità irriducibile al contesto che ci circonda. Alessandro polemizza contro questa tesi. Egli sostiene che, sebbene tutto ha una causa, non tutto è necessario ; inoltre non è possibile sostenere insieme che tutto è necessario, e che le nostre azioni dipendono da noi. Per comprendere come ciò sia possibile, egli afferma, si deve tornare alla teoria delle cause di Aristotele.
'One', Aristotle says, can be said in many ways and each being is one. Through a comprehensive analysis of the passages in which Aristotle makes sense of these claims, the book provides a detailed account of how the different ways of being one permeate the domain of being and explores Aristotle's approach to the notion of unity from the ontological, cosmological and dialectical point of view. In rejecting what he regards as an 'archaic' conception of being, Aristotle rejects a corresponding 'archaic' conception of the one and shows how, within the framework of his philosophy of being and substance, different problems and different paradigmatic forms of unity coexist and make of unity a privileged ground for the exercise of philosophical thought.
Este libro examina la teoría del azar de Aristóteles, presentada en Phys. II 4-6, en el contexto de la discusión de los principios y causas de la filosofía natural. Teniendo siempre en vista este contexto, la autora elabora una interpretación de la definición genérica de azar como un cierto tipo de relación causal accidental, mostrando posteriormente cómo las dos especies de azar que distingue Aristóteles en Phys. II 6 (týche y autómaton) comparten dicha estructura común.
En esta tarea, resulta relevante el esclarecimiento del modo específico en que este tipo de causalidad se da en la naturaleza y en la acción humana.
Nel Timeo e nel Crizia Platone intreccia due racconti : la formazione del cosmo governata dal demiurgo e la vittoria di Atene arcaica contro Atlantide. Scopo di questo lavoro è indagare il rapporto della prassi narrativa del Timeo e del Crizia con l'indagine teorica sulla natura della produzione poetica condotta da Socrate nel III e nel X libro della Repubblica. A lato degli aspetti metafisici, ontologici e politici, traspare lo statuto letterario che contraddistingue il Timeo e il Crizia, uno statuto che permette di sviluppare le riflessioni della Repubblica. Platone con i due racconti di Timeo e di Crizia eredita e supera la produzione poetica in fase arcaica e classica.
The title of this volume alludes to Phaedrus 255d, where Socrates says that the lover is, as it were, the mirror in which the beloved beholds himself. Mirrors provide a chance to overcome some of the natural limitations of vision - and in particular they enable us to see that which otherwise would remain completely out of sight and in this sense is the farthest object, namely : oneself.
The papers in this volume share the notion that the study of Plato - and notably the study of the Phaedrus - can be much more than the study of one of the major philosophical works of the so-called Western Canon. According to this view, Plato's Phaedrus holds a mirror or is itself a mirror : a metaphorical mirror in which we can see blind spots viz. things outside our normal «field of vision» - and in particular a metaphorical mirror in which we can see ourselves reflected and discover blind spots in our own awareness of self and others.
This book is a study of Plato's portraiture of Socrates and of his ß??? f???s?f???? and of the cultural semantics that underlie it. It focuses on the account of Socrates'final day in the Phaedo, an account that constitutes both an aretalogy and a martyrology, especially on the introductory part of this particular dialogue (57a-61c), with particular emphasis on the repeated references to Aesop and on Socrates'reported versification of fables.
The intended parallelism between Socrates and Aesop in the Phaedo (amplified by Apollo's decisive presence and intervention as this is suggested in the accounts of their lives and especially of their deaths), both of them charter figures for philosophical and fable discourse respectively, alongside the accentuation throughout the dialogue of Socrates'exceptional attitude in the face of death, served Plato's strategy to inscribe his model philosophos in the traditions of the unjustly murdered and posthumously exonerated and vindicated pharmakos and of heroized eminent men. It is hoped that this view of Plato's heroic portrait of Socrates as the result of a fusion of well-established, preceding cultural notions and traditions shall provide another interpretative viewpoint of Plato's work, with respect both to its literary aspect (our reading of the dialogues) and to its institutional aspect (the sociopolitics involved in the establishment of the Academy).
